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Abstract
Cognition does not only depend on bottom-up sensor fea-
ture abstraction, but also relies on contextual information be-
ing passed top-down. Context is higher level information that
helps to predict belief states at lower levels. The main contri-
bution of this paper is to provide a formalisation of perceptual
context and its integration into a new process model for cog-
nitive hierarchies. Several simple instantiations of a cognitive
hierarchy are used to illustrate the role of context. Notably,
we demonstrate the use context in a novel approach to visu-
ally track the pose of rigid objects with just a 2D camera.
Introduction
There is strong evidence that intelligence necessarily in-
volves hierarchical structures (Ashby 1952; Brooks 1986;
Dietterich 2000; Albus and Meystel 2001; Beer 1966;
Turchin 1977; Hubel and Wiesel 1979; Minsky 1986;
Drescher 1991; Dayan and Hinton 1992; Kaelbling 1993;
Nilsson 2001; Konidaris et al. 2011; Jong 2010; Marthi,
Russell, and Andre 2006; Bakker and Schmidhuber 2004).
Clark et al. (2016) recently have addressed the formali-
sation of cognitive hierarchies that allow for the integra-
tion of disparate representations, including symbolic and
sub-symbolic representations, in a framework for cognitive
robotics. Sensory information processing is upward-feeding,
progressively abstracting more complex state features, while
behaviours are downward-feeding progressively becoming
more concrete, ultimately controlling robot actuators.
However, neuroscience suggests that the brain is subject
to top-down cognitive influences for attention, expectation
and perception (Gilbert and Li 2013). Higher level signals
carry important information to facilitate scene interpretation.
For example, the recognition of the Dalmatian, and the dis-
ambiguation of the symbol /−\ in Figure 1 intuitively show
that higher level context is necessary to correctly interpret
these images1. Furthermore, the human brain is able to make
sense of dynamic 3D scenes from light falling on our 2D
retina in varying lighting conditions. Replicating this ability
is still a challenge in artificial intelligence and computer vi-
sion, particularly when objects move relative to each other,
can occlude each other, and are without texture. Prior, more
1Both of these examples appear in (Johnson 2010) but are also
well-known in the cognitive psychology literature.
Figure 1: The image on the left would probably be indis-
cernible without prior knowledge of Dalmations. The am-
biguous symbol /−\ on the right can be interpreted as either
an “H” or an “A” depending on the word context.
abstract contextual knowledge is important to help segment
images into objects or to confirm the presence of an object
from faint or partial edges in an image.
In this paper we extend the existing cognitive hierarchy
formalisation (Clark et al. 2016) by introducing the notion
of perceptual context, which modifies the beliefs of a child
node given the beliefs of its parent nodes. It is worth empha-
sising that defining the role of context as a top-down predic-
tive influence on a node’s belief state and the correspond-
ing process model that defines how the cognitive hierarchy
evolves over time is non-trivial. Our formalisation captures
the dual influences of context and behaviour as a predictive
update of a node’s belief state. Consequently, the main con-
tribution of this paper is the inclusion and formalisation of
contextual influences as a predictive update within a cogni-
tive hierarchy.
As a meta-framework, the cognitive hierarchy requires in-
stantiation. We provide two simple instantiation examples
to help illustrate the formalisation of context. The first is a
running example using a small belief network. The second
example involves visual servoing to track a moving object.
This second example quantifies the benefit of context and
demonstrates the role of context in a complete cognitive hi-
erarchy including behaviour generation.
As a third, realistic and challenging example that high-
lights the importance of context we consider the tracking of
the 6 DoF pose of multiple, possibly occluded, marker-less
objects with a 2D camera. We provide a novel instantiation
of a cognitive hierarchy for a real robot using the context of
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a spatial cognitive node modelled using a 3D physics simu-
lator. Note, this formalisation is provided in outline only due
to space restrictions.
Finally, for completeness of our belief network running
example, we prove that general belief propagation in causal
trees (Pearl 1988) can be embedded into our framework, il-
lustrating the versatility of including context in the cognitive
hierarchy. We include this proof as an appendix.
The Architectural Framework
For the sake of brevity the following presentation both sum-
marises and extends the formalisation of cognitive hierar-
chies as introduced in (Clark et al. 2016). We shall, how-
ever, highlight how our contribution differs from their work.
The essence of this framework is to adopt a meta-theoretic
approach, formalising the interaction between abstract cog-
nitive nodes, while making no commitments about the repre-
sentation and reasoning mechanism within individual nodes.
Motivating Example
As an explanatory aid to formalising the use of context in a
hierarchy we will use the disambiguation of the symbol /−\
in Figure 1 as a simple running example. This system can
be modelled as a two layer causal tree updated according
Pearl’s Bayesian belief propagation rules (Pearl 1988). The
lower-level layer disambiguates individual letters while the
higher-level layer disambiguates complete words (Figure 2).
We assume that there are only two words that are expected
to be seen, with equal probability: “THE” and “CAT”.
Figure 2: Disambiguating the symbol /−\ requires context
from the word recognition layer.
There are three independent letter sensors with the middle
sensor being unable to disambiguate the observed symbol
/−\ represented by the conditional probabilities p(/−\|H) =
0.5 and p(/−\|A) = 0.5. These sensors feed into the lower-
level nodes (or processors in Pearl’s terminology), which we
label asN1, N2, N3. The results of the lower level nodes are
combined at N4 to disambiguate the observed word.
Each node maintains two state variables; the diagnostic
and causal supports (displayed as the pairs of values in
Figure 2). Intuitively, the diagnostic support represents the
knowledge gathered through sensing while the causal sup-
port represents the contextual bias. A node’s overall belief is
calculated by the combination of these two state variables.
While sensing data propagates up the causal tree, the ex-
ample highlights how node N2 is only able to resolve the
symbol /−\ in the presence of contextual feedback from N4.
Nodes
A cognitive hierarchy consists of a set of nodes. Nodes are
tasked to achieve a goal or maximise future value. They have
two primary functions: world-modelling and behaviour-
generation. World-modelling involves maintaining a belief
state, while behaviour-generation is achieved through poli-
cies, where a policy maps states to sets of actions. A node’s
belief state is modified by sensing or by the combination
of actions and higher-level context. We refer to this latter
as prediction update to highlight how it sets an expectation
about what the node is expecting to observe in the future.
Definition 1. A cognitive language is a tuple L =
(S,A, T ,O, C), where S is a set of belief states, A is a set
of actions, T is a set of task parameters, O is a set of ob-
servations, and C is a set of contextual elements. A cognitive
node is a tuple N = (L,Π, λ, τ , γ, s0, pi0) s.t:
• L is the cognitive language for N , with initial belief state
s0 ∈ S.
• Π a set of policies such that for all pi ∈ Π, pi : S → 2A,
with initial policy pi0 ∈ Π.
• A policy selection function λ : 2T → Π, s.t. λ({}) = pi0.
• A observation update operator τ : 2O × S → S.
• A prediction update operator γ : 2C × 2A × S → S.
Definition 1 differs from (Clark et al. 2016) in two ways:
the introduction of a set of context elements in the cogni-
tive language, and the modification of the prediction update
operator, previously called the action update operator, to in-
clude context elements when updating the belief state.
This definition can now be applied to the motivating ex-
ample to instantiate the nodes in the Bayesian causal tree.
We highlight only the salient features for this instantiation.
Example. Let E = {〈x, y〉 | 0≤ x, y ≤ 1.0} be the set of
probability pairs, representing the recognition between two
distinct features. For node N2, say (cf. Figure 2), these fea-
tures are the letters “H” and “A” and for N4 these are the
words “THE” and “CAT”. The set of belief states for N2 is
S2 = {〈〈d〉, c〉 | d, c ∈ E}, where d is the diagnostic support
and c is the causal support. Note, the vector-in-vector for-
mat allows for structural uniformity across nodes. Assum-
ing equal probability over letters, the initial belief state is
〈〈〈0.5, 0.5〉〉, 〈0.5, 0.5〉〉. For N4 the set of belief states is
S4 = 〈〈d1, d2, d3〉, c〉 | d1, d2, d3, c ∈ E}, where di is the
contribution of node N i to the diagnostic support of N4.
For N2 the context is the causal supports from above,
C2 = E, while the observations capture the influence of
the “H”-“A” sensor, O2 = {〈d〉 | d ∈ E}. In con-
trast the observations for N4 need to capture the influ-
ence of the different child diagnostic supports, so O4 =
{〈d1, d2, d3〉 | d1, d2, d3 ∈ E}.
The observation update operators need to replace the di-
agnostic supports of the current belief with the observation,
which is more complicated for N4 due to its multiple chil-
dren, τ2({ ~d1, ~d2, ~d3}, 〈~d, c〉) = 〈Σ3i=1~di, c〉. Ignoring the
influence of actions, the prediction update operator simply
replaces the causal support of the current belief with the
context from above, so γ2({c′}, ∅, 〈〈~d〉, c〉) = 〈〈~d〉, c′〉.
Cognitive Hierarchy
Nodes are interlinked in a hierarchy, where sensing data is
passed up the abstraction hierarchy, while actions and con-
text are sent down the hierarchy (Figure 3).
World
Modelling
Behaviour
Generation
State
Actions
Context enrichment function
Sensing function
Task parameter function
External world node
1 2 3
1
2
3
Figure 3: A cognitive hierarchy, highlighting internal inter-
actions as well as the sensing, action, and context graphs.
Definition 2. A cognitive hierarchy is a tuple H =
(N , N0, F ) s.t:
• N is a set of cognitive nodes and N0 ∈ N is a distin-
guished node corresponding to the external world.
• F is a set of function triples 〈φi,j , ψj,i, %j,i〉 ∈ F that
connect nodes N i, N j ∈ N where:
– φi,j : Si → 2Oj is a sensing function, and
– ψj,i : 2Aj → 2T i is a task parameter function.
– %j,i : Sj → 2Ci is a context enrichment function.
• Sensing graph: each φi,j represents an edge from node
N i to N j and forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with
N0 as the unique source node of the graph.
• Prediction graph: the set of task parameter functions
(equivalently, the context enrichment functions) forms a
converse to the sensing graph such that N0 is the unique
sink node of the graph.
Definition 2 differs from the original with the introduc-
tion of the context enrichment functions and the naming of
the prediction graph (originally the action graph). The con-
nection between nodes consists of triples of sensing, task pa-
rameter and context functions. The sensing function extracts
observations from a lower-level node in order to update a
higher level node, while the context enrichment function
performs the converse. The task parameter function trans-
lates a higher-level node’s actions into a set of task parame-
ters, which is then used to select the active policy for a node.
Finally, the external world is modelled as a distinguished
node, N0. Sensing functions allow other nodes to observe
properties of the external world, and task parameter func-
tions allow actuator values to be modified, but N0 doesn’t
“sense” properties of other nodes, nor does it generate task
parameters for those nodes. Similarly, context enrichment
functions connected to N0 would simply return the empty
set, unless one wanted to model unusual properties akin to
the quantum effects of observations on the external world.
Beyond this, the internal behaviour of N0 is considered to
be opaque.
The running example can now be encoded formally as a
cognitive hierarchy, again with the following showing only
the salient features of the encoding.
Example. We construct a hierarchy H = (N , N0, F ), with
N = {N0, N1, . . . , N4}. The function triples in F will in-
clude φ0,2 for the visual sensing of the middle letter, and φ2,4
and %4,2 for the sensing and context between N2 and N4.
The function φ0,2 returns the probability of the input being
the characters “H” and “A”. Here φ0,2(/−\) = {〈0.5, 0.5〉}.
Defining φ2,4 and %4,2 requires a conditional probability
matrix M =
[
1 0
0 1
]
to capture how the letters “H” and
“A” contribute to the recognition of “THE” and “CAT”.
For sensing from N2 we use zeroed vectors to prevent
influence from the diagnostic support components from N1
andN2. Hence φ2,4(〈〈d〉, c〉)= {〈〈0, 0〉,η ·M ·dT , 〈0, 0〉〉},
where dT is the transpose of vector d, and η is a normalisa-
tion constant.
For context we capture how N4’s causal support and its
diagnostic support components from N1 and N2 influences
the causal support of N2. Note, that this also prevents any
feedback from N2’s own diagnostic support to its causal
support. So, %4,2(〈〈d1, d2, d3〉, c〉)={η · (d1 · d3 · c) ·M}.
Active Cognitive Hierarchy
The above definitions capture the static aspects of a system
but require additional details to model its operational be-
haviour. Note, the following definitions are unmodified from
the original formalism and are presented here because they
are necessary to the developments of later sections.
Definition 3. An active cognitive node is a tuple Q =
(N, s, pi, a) where: 1) N is a cognitive node with S, Π, and
A being its set of belief states, set of policies, and set of ac-
tions respectively, 2) s ∈ S is the current belief state, pi ∈ Π
is the current policy, and a ∈ 2A is the current set of actions.
Essentially an active cognitive node couples a (static) cog-
nitive node with some dynamic information; in particular the
current belief state, policy and set of actions.
Definition 4. An active cognitive hierarchy is a tuple X =
(H,Q) where H is a cognitive hierarchy with set of cogni-
tive nodes N such that for each N ∈ N there is a corre-
sponding active cognitive node Q = (N, s, pi, a) ∈ Q and
vice-versa.
The active cognitive hierarchy captures the dynamic state
of the system at a particular instance in time. Finally, an ini-
tial active cognitive hierarchy is an active hierarchy where
each node is initialised with the initial belief state and policy
of the corresponding cognitive node, as well as an empty set
of actions.
Cognitive Process Model
The process model defines how an active cognitive hierarchy
evolves over time and consists of two steps. Firstly, sensing
observations are passed up the hierarchy, progressively up-
dating the belief state of each node. Next, task parameters
and context are passed down the hierarchy updating the ac-
tive policy, the actions, and the belief state of the nodes.
We do not present all definitions here, in particular we
omit the definition of the sensing update operator as this re-
mains unchanged in our extension. Instead we define a pre-
diction update operator, replacing the original action update,
with the new operator incorporating both context and task
parameters in its update. First, we characterise the updating
of the beliefs and actions for a single active cognitive node.
Definition 5. Let X =(H,Q) be an active cognitive hierar-
chy with H= (N , N0, F ). The prediction update of X with
respect to an active cognitive node Qi = (N i, si, pii, ai) ∈Q, written as PredUpdate′(X , Qi) is an active cognitive hi-
erarchy X ′ = (H,Q′) where Q′ = Q\{Qi} ∪ {Q′i} and
Q′i = (N i, γi(C, a
′
i, si), pi
′
i, a
′
i) s.t:
• if there is no node Nx where 〈φi,x, ψx,i, %x,i〉 ∈ F then:
pi′i=pii, a
′
i=pii(si) and C=∅,
• else:
pi′i = λi (T ) and a
′
i = pi
′
i(si),
T =
⋃{ψx,i(ax) | 〈φi,x, ψx,i, %x,i〉 ∈ F where
Qx = (Nx, sx, pix, ax) ∈ Q}
C =
⋃{%x,i(sx) | 〈φi,x, ψx,i, %x,i〉 ∈ F where
Qx = (Nx, sx, pix, ax) ∈ Q}
The intuition for Definition 5 is straightforward. Given
a cognitive hierarchy and a node to be updated, the update
process returns an identical hierarchy except for the updated
node. This node is updated by first selecting a new active
policy based on the task parameters of all the connected
higher-level nodes. The new active policy is applied to the
existing belief state to generate a new set of actions. Both
these actions and the context from the connected higher-
level nodes are then used to update the node’s belief state.
Using the single node update, updating the entire hierar-
chy simply involves successively updating all its nodes.
Definition 6. Let X = (H,Q) be an active cognitive hier-
archy with H = (N , N0, F ) and Ψ be the prediction graph
induced by the task parameter functions in F . The action
process update of X , written PredUpdate(X ), is an active
cognitive model:
X ′ = PredUpdate′(. . .PredUpdate′(X , Qn), . . . Q0)
where the sequence [Qn, . . . , Q0] consists of all active cog-
nitive nodes of the set Q such that the sequence satisfies the
partial ordering induced by the prediction graph Ψ.
Importantly, the update ordering in Definition 6 satisfies
the partial ordering induced by the prediction graph, thus
guaranteeing that the prediction update is well-defined.
Lemma 1. For any active cognitive hierarchy X the predic-
tion process update of X is well-defined.
Proof. Follows from the DAG.
The final part of the process model, which we omit here,
is the combined operator, Update, that first performs a sens-
ing update followed by a prediction update. This operation
follows exactly the original and similarly the theorem that
the process model is well-defined also follows.
We can now apply the update process (sensing then pre-
diction) to show how it operates on the running example.
Example. WhenN2 senses the symbol /−\, φ0,2 returns that
“A” and “H” are equally likely, so τ2 updates the diag-
nostic support of N2 to 〈〈0.5, 0.5〉〉. On the other hand N1
and N2 unambiguously sense “C” and “T” respectively, so
N4’s observation update operator, τ4, will update its diag-
nostic support components to 〈〈0, 1〉, 〈0.5, 0.5〉, 〈0, 1〉〉. The
nodes overall belief, 〈0, 1〉, is the normalised product of the
diagnostic support components and the causal support, in-
dicating here the unambiguous recognition of “CAT”.
Next, during prediction update, context fromN4 is passed
back down to N2, through φ4,2 and γ2, updating the causal
support of N2 to 〈0, 1〉. Hence, N2 is left with the belief
state 〈〈〈0.5, 0.5〉〉, 〈0, 1〉〉, which when combined, indicates
that the symbol /−\ should be interpreted as an “A”.
We next appeal to another simple example to illustrate the
use of context to improve world modelling and in turn be-
haviour generation in a cognitive hierarchy.
A Simple Visual Servoing Example
Consider a mobile camera tasked to track an object sliding
down a frictionless inclined plane. The controller is con-
structed as a three-node cognitive hierarchy. Figure 4 depicts
the cognitive hierarchy and the scene.
Figure 4: A three-node cognitive hierarchy controller tasked
to visually follow an object. Context flow is shown in red.
The performance of the controller will be determined by
how well the camera keeps the object in the centre of its
field-of-view, specifically the average error in the tracking
distance over a time period of 3 seconds.
The details of the instantiation of the cognitive hier-
archy controller follow. The cognitive hierarchy is H =
(N , N0, F ) with N = {N0, N1, N2}. N0 is the unique
opaque node representing the environment. The cognitive
language for N1 is a tuple L1 = (S1,A1, T 1,O1, C1),
and for N2 it is L2=(S2,A2, T 2,O2, C2). The cognitive
nodes are N1 = (L1,Π1, λ1, τ1, γ1, s01, pi01) and N2 =
(L2,Π2, λ2, τ2, γ2, s02, pi02). For brevity we only describe the
material functions.
The belief state of N1 is the position of the object: S1 =
{x | x∈R}. The belief state of N2 is both the position and
velocity of the object: S2 = {〈x, v〉 | x, v ∈R}. The object
starts at rest on the inclined plane at the origin: s01 = 0.0 and
s02 = 〈0.0, 0.0〉.
N1 receives object position observations from the envi-
ronment: O1 = {x | x∈R}. These measurements are simu-
lated from the physical properties of the scene and include a
noise component to represent errors in the sensor measure-
ments: φ0,1(·) = {0.5kt2 + ν}, with constant acceleration
k = 8.49 m/s2, t the elapsed time and ν zero mean Gaus-
sian random noise with a standard deviation of 0.1. The ac-
celeration assumes an inclined plane of 60 degrees in a 9.8
m/s2 gravitational field. The N1 observation update oper-
ator implements a Kalman filter with a fixed gain of 0.25:
τ1(〈{x}, y〉) = (1.0− 0.25)y + 0.25x.
N2 receives observations O2 = {x | x ∈ R} from N1:
φ1,2(x) = {x}. In turn it updates its position estimate ac-
cepting the value from N1: τ2(〈{x}, 〈y, v〉〉) = 〈x, v〉. The
prediction update operator uses a physics model to estimate
the new position and velocity of the object after time-step
δt = 0.05 seconds: γ2(〈{}, {}, 〈x, v〉〉) = 〈x + vδt +
0.5kδt2, v + kδt〉 with known acceleration k = 8.49.
Both N1 and N2 have one policy function each. The N2
policy selects the N1 policy. The effect of the N1 policy:
pi1(x) = {x}, is to move the camera to the estimated posi-
tion of the object via the task parameter function connecting
the environment: ψ1,0({x}) = {x}.
We consider two versions of the N1 prediction up-
date operator. Without context the next state is the com-
manded policy action: γ1(〈{x}, {y}, z〉) = y. With con-
text the context enrichment function passes the N2 estimate
of the position of the object to N1: %2,1(〈x, v〉) = {x},
where C1 = {x | x ∈ R}. The update operator becomes:
γ1(〈{x}, {y}, z〉) = x.
When we simulate the dynamics and the repeated up-
date of the cognitive hierarchy at 1/δt Hertz for 3 seconds,
we find that without context the average tracking error is
2.004 ± 0.009. Using context the average tracking error re-
duces to 0.125± 0.015—a 94% error reduction.2
Using Context to Track Objects Visually
Object tracking has application in augmented reality, vi-
sual servoing, and man-machine interfaces. We consider the
problem of on-line monocular model-based tracking of mul-
tiple objects without markers or texture, using the 2D RGB
camera built into the hand of a Baxter robot. The use of nat-
ural object features makes this a challenging problem.
Current practice for tackling this problem is to use 3D
knowledge in the form of a CAD model, from which to gen-
erate a set of edge points (control points) for the object (Lep-
etit and Fua 2005) . The idea is to track the corresponding 2D
camera image points of the visible 3D control points as the
object moves relatively to the camera. The new pose of the
object relative to the camera is found by minimising the per-
spective re-projection error between the control points and
their corresponding 2D image.
2It is of course intuitive in this simple example that as N2 has
the benefit of the knowledge of the transition dynamics of the ob-
ject it can better estimate its position and provide this context to
direct the camera.
However, when multiple objects are tracked, indepen-
dent CAD models fail to handle object occlusion. In place
of the CAD models we use the machinery provided by a
3D physics simulator. The object-scene and virtual cameras
from a simulator are ideal to model the higher level context
for vision. We now describe how this approach is instanti-
ated as a cognitive hierarchy with contextual feedback. It is
important to note that the use of the physics simulator is not
to replace the real-world, but is used as mental imagery effi-
ciently representing the spatial belief state of the robot.
Cognitive Hierarchy for Visual Tracking
We focus on world-modelling in a two-node cognitive hier-
archy (Figure 5). The external world node that includes the
Baxter robot, streams the camera pose and RGB images as
sensory input to the arm node. The arm node belief state
s = {pa} ∪ {〈pia, ci〉|object i}, where pa is the arm pose,
and for all recognised objects i in the field of view of the
arm camera, pia is the object pose relative to the arm camera,
and ci is the set of object edge lines and their depth. The
objects in this case include scattered cubes on a table. In-
formation from the arm node is sent to the spatial node that
employs a Gazebo physics simulator as mental imagery to
model the objects.
Figure 5: Cognitive hierarchy comprising an arm node and a
spatial node. Context from the spatial node is in the form of
an object segmented depth image from a simulated special
camera that shadows the real camera.
A novel feature of the spatial node is that it simulates the
robot’s arm camera as an object aware depth camera. No
such camera exist reality, but the Gazebo spatial belief state
of the robot is able to not only provide a depth image, but
one that segments the depth image by object. This object
aware depth image provides the context to the arm node to
generate the required control points.
Update Functions and Process Update
We now describe the update functions and a single cycle of
the process update for this cognitive hierarchy.
The real monocular RGB arm camera is simulated in
Gazebo with an object aware depth camera with identical
characteristics (i.e. the same intrinsic camera matrix). The
simulated camera then produces depth and an object seg-
mentation images from the simulated objects that corre-
sponds to the actual camera image. This vital contextual in-
formation is then used for correcting the pose of the visible
objects.
The process update starts with the sensing function
φN0,Arm that takes the raw camera image and observes all
edges in the image, represented as a set of line segments, l.
φN0,Arm({rawImage}) = {l}
The observation update operator τArm takes the expected
edge lines ci for each object i and transforms the lines to
best match the image edge lines l (Lepetit and Fua 2005).
The update function uses the OpenCV function solvePnP to
find a corrected pose pia for each object i relative to the arm-
camera a 3.
τArm({l, ci|object i}) = {pia|object i}
The sensing function from the arm to spatial node takes
the corrected pose pia for each object i, relative to the camera
frame a, and transforms it into the Gazebo reference frame
via the Baxter’s reference frame given the camera pose pa.
φArm,Spatial({pa, 〈pia, ci〉|object i}) = {gia|object i}
The spatial node observation update τSpatial, updates the
pose of all viewed objects gia in the Gazebo physics simula-
tor. Note {gia|object i} ⊂ gazebo state.
τSpatial({gia|object i}) = gazebo.move(i, gia) ∀i
The update cycle now proceeds down the hierarchy with
prediction updates. The prediction update for the spatial
node γSpatial consists of predicting the interaction of ob-
jects in the simulator under gravity. Noise introduced during
the observation update may result in objects separating due
to detected collisions or settling under gravity.
γSpatial(gazebo state) = gazebo.simulate(gazebo state))
We now turn to the context enrichment function
%Spatial,Arm that extracts predicted camera image edge lines
and depth data for each object in view of the simulator.
%Spatial,Arm(gazebo state) = {ci|object i}
The stages of the context enrichment function %Spatial,Arm
are shown in Figure 6. The simulated depth camera extracts
an object image that identifies the object seen at every pixel
location. It also extracts a depth image that gives the depth
from the camera of every pixel. The object image is used to
mask out each object in turn. Applying a Laplacian function
to the part of the depth image masked out by the object yields
all visible edges of the object. A Hough line transform iden-
tifies line end points in the Laplacian image and finds the
depth of their endpoints from the depth image, producing ci.
Figure 7 shows the cognitive hierarchy tracking several
different cube configurations. This is only possible given the
context from the spatial belief state. Keeping track of the
pose of objects allows behaviours to be generated that for
example pick up a cube with appropriately oriented grippers.
3The pose of a rigid object in 3D space has 6 degrees of free-
dom, three describing its translated position, and three the rotation
or orientation, relative to a reference pose.
Figure 6: The Process update showing stages of the context
enrichment function and the matching of contextual infor-
mation to the real camera to correct the arm and spatial node
belief state.
Figure 7: Tracking several cube configurations. Top row:
Gazebo GUI showing spatial node state. 2nd row: matching
real image edges in green to simulated image edges in red.
Bottom row: camera image overlaid with edges in green.
Related Support and Conclusion
There is considerable evidence supporting the existence and
usefulness of top-down contextual information. Reliability
(Biederman, Kubovy, and Pomerantz 1981) and speed (Ca-
vanagh 1991) of scene analysis provides early evidence.
These observations are further supported by neuroscience,
suggesting that feedback pathways from higher more ab-
stract processing areas of the brain down to areas closer to
the sensors are greater than those transmitting information
upwards (Hawkins and Blakeslee 2004). The authors sum-
marise the process - “what is actually happening flows up,
and what you expect to happen flows down”. Gilbert and
Li (2013) argue that the traditional idea that the processing
of visual information consists of a sequence of feedforward
operations needs to be supplemented by top-down contex-
tual influences.
In the field of robotics, recent work in online interac-
tive perception shows the benefit of predicted measurements
from one level being passed to the next-lower level as state
predictions (Martin and Brock 2014).
This paper has included and formalised the essential el-
ement of context in the meta framework of cognitive hier-
archies. The process model of an active cognitive hierarchy
has been revised to include context updates satisfying the
partial order induced by the prediction graph. We have il-
lustrated the role of context with two simple examples and a
novel way to track the pose of texture-less objects with a sin-
gle 2D camera. As a by-product contribution we prove that
general belief propagation in causal trees can be embedded
into our framework testifying to its representation versatility.
Appendices
Causal Networks as Cognitive Hierarchies
The motivating example highlighted the use of context in a
cognitive hierarchy inspired by belief propagation in causal
trees. In this appendix we extend the example to the general
result that any Bayesian causal tree can be encoded as a cog-
nitive hierarchy. We do this by constructively showing how
to encode a causal tree as a cognitive hierarchy and proving
the correctness of this method with respect to propagating
changes through the tree.
Pearl describes a causal tree as a set of processors where
the connection between processors is explicitly represented
within the processors themselves. Each processor maintains
diagnostic and causal supports, as well as maintaining a
conditional probability matrix for translating to the repre-
sentation of higher-level processors. The description of the
operational behaviour of causal trees is presented throughout
Chapter 4 (and summarised in Figure 4.15) of Pearl (1988).
The cognitive hierarchies introduced here are concerned
with robotic systems and consequently maintain an explicit
notion of sensing over time. In contrast causal networks are
less precise about external inputs and changes over time. As
a bridge, we model that each processor has a diagnostic sup-
port component that can be set externally. Finally, note that
we adopt the convenience notation f∅ to represent a function
of arbitrary arity that always returns the empty set.
Definition 7. Let {P 1, . . . Pn} be a causal tree. We
construct a corresponding cognitive hierarchy H =
({N0, N1, . . . , Nn}, N0, F ) as follows:
• For processor P i with m children, and diagnos-
tic and causal supports d, c ∈ Rn, define Si =
{〈〈dE , d1, . . . , dm〉, c′〉|dE , d1, . . . , dm, c′ ∈ Rn}, with
initial belief state si = 〈〈d, . . . , d〉, c〉. Define Oi =
{〈dE , d1, . . . , dm〉|dE , d1, . . . , dm ∈ Rn} and Ci=Rn.
• For processor P i with corresponding cognitive
node N i, define τ i(o, 〈~d, c〉) = 〈Σ~d′∈o~d′, c〉, and
γi({c′}, ∅, 〈~d, c〉) = 〈~d, c′〉.
• For each pair of processors P i and P j , where P j is the
k-th child of P i’s m children (from processor subscript
numbering), and Mj is the conditional probability matrix
of P j , then define a triple 〈φj,i, f∅, %i,j〉 ∈ F s.t:
– φj,i(〈~d, c〉) = {〈dE , d1, . . . , dm〉}, where dh 6=k are ze-
roed vectors and dk = η ·Mj · (
∏
d′∈~d d
′)T .
– %i,j(〈〈dE , d1, . . . , dm〉, c〉) = {c′}, such that c′ = η ·
(
∏
h6=k dh · c) ·Mj .
– where η is a normalisation constant for the respective
vectors, and xT is the transpose of vector x.
• For processors P i, with diagnostic support d ∈ Rn, de-
fine a triple 〈φ0,i, f∅, f∅〉 ∈ F where φ0,i(s0 ∈ S0) =
{〈dE , dZ , . . . , dZ〉}, where dZ is a zeroed vector and
dE ∈ Rn is the external input of P i.
While notationally dense, Definition 7 is simply a gen-
eralisation of the construction used in the running example
and is a direct encoding of causal trees. Note, this construc-
tion could be further extended to poly-trees, which Pearl also
considers, but would require a more complex encoding.
To establish the correctness of this transformation we can
compare how the structures evolve with sensing. The belief
measure of a processor is captured as the normalised product
of the diagnostic and causal supports, BEL(Pi) = η · di · ci.
However, for a cognitive node the diagnostic support needs
to be computed from its components. Hence, given the be-
lief state 〈〈dE , d1, . . . , dm〉, c〉 of an active node Qi with
m children, we can compute the belief as BEL(Qi) =
η ·∏mj=1 dj · c.
Lemma 2. Given a causal tree {P 1, . . . Pn} and a cor-
responding cognitive hierarchy H constructed via Defini-
tion 7, then the causal tree and the initial active cognitive
hierarchy corresponding to H share the same belief.
Proof. By inspection, BEL(P i) = BEL(Qi) for each
i.
Now, we establish that propagating changes through an
active cognitive hierarchy is consistent with propagating be-
liefs through a causal tree. We abuse notation here to express
the overall belief of a casual tree (resp. active cognitive hier-
archy) as simply the beliefs of its processors (resp. nodes).
Theorem 3. Let T be a causal tree and X be the corre-
sponding active cognitive hierarchy constructed via Defini-
tion 7, such thatBEL(T ) = BEL(X ). Then for any changes
to the external diagnostic supports of the processors and
corresponding changes to the sensing inputs for the active
cognitive hierarchy, BEL(Prop(T )) = BEL(Update(X )).
Proof. Pearl establishes that changes propagated through a
causal tree converge with a single pass up and down the tree.
Any such pass satisfies the partial ordering for the cognitive
hierarchy process model. Hence the proof involves the iter-
ative application of the process model, confirming at each
step that the beliefs of the processors and nodes align.
Theorem 3 establishes that Bayesian causal trees can be
captured as cognitive hierarchies. This highlights the signif-
icance of extending cognitive hierarchies to include context,
allowing for a richer set of potential applications.
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